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Abstract
The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2011 in the small Tunisian city of Sidi
Bouzid, set off a sequence of events culminating in the revolutions of the Arab Spring. It is widely believed
that the Internet and social media played a critical role in the growth and success of protests that led to
the downfall of the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. However, the precise mechanisms by which these new
media affected the course of events remains unclear. We introduce a simple compartmental model for the
dynamics of a revolution in a dictatorial regime such as Tunisia or Egypt which takes into account the
role of the Internet and social media. An elementary mathematical analysis of the model identifies four
main parameter regions: stable police state, meta-stable police state, unstable police state, and failed
state. We illustrate how these regions capture, at least qualitatively, a wide range of scenarios observed
in the context of revolutionary movements by considering the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, as well
as the situation in Iran, China, and Somalia, as case studies. We pose four questions about the dynamics
of the Arab Spring revolutions and formulate answers informed by the model. We conclude with some
possible directions for future work.
1 Introduction and Motivation
“After decades of political stagnation... new winds of hope were felt in the Middle East,
accompanied by a new catchword making the rounds in the American media, ‘Arab Spring’... The
age of the old patriarchs, it appeared, was nearing its end. And the new media - satellite television,
mobile phones, the Internet - were often regarded as having precipitated this development by
undermining governments’ hegemonic control over the flow of information.”
When Albrecht Hofheinz wrote these words he was referring to modest advancements being made in
democracy and political liberalization in a handful of Middle Eastern countries in 2005 [Hofheinz, 2005].
He did not foresee the events sparked by Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17, 2010 that
ultimately led to the Arab Spring revolutions. Nevertheless, his analysis of new media and their impact on
Arab society are eerily prescient, especially considering that in 2005 social media was either in its infancy or
completely non-existent1. He concludes,
“The Internet is one factor that in tandem with others (satellite TV, youth culture, and the
‘globalization’ of consumer products, social networks, and ideational configurations) is creating a
dynamic of change that is helping to erode the legitimacy of traditional authority structures in
family, society, culture/religion, and also the state, and thus creating pressure for reform.”
Consistent with Hofheinz [2005], the predominant view is that the Internet and social media played a
critical role in the Arab Spring of 2010-2011 [Howard et al., 2011, Lotan et al., 2011, Alterman, 2011, Husain
and Pollack, 2011, Khamis and Vaughn, 2011, Pollock, 2011, Saletan, 2011, Shirky, 2011, Stepanova, 2011,
1Facebook was launched in 2004 and was still an invitation-only service in 2005 [Phillips, 2007]. Youtube was founded in
early 2005 [YouTube, 2012] and Twitter was not founded until the spring of 2006 [Picard, 2011].
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Zhuo et al., 2011]. Although most of these opinions are based on anecdotal evidence, some rigorous work
has been done attempting to determine a link between social media and protests using, for example, Twitter
data [Howard et al., 2011, Lotan et al., 2011]. Needless to say, many questions remain, for example:
1. How can a small number of active social media users and relatively low Internet penetration2 have a
dramatic effect on the stability of a regime?,
2. How is it that regimes manage to seem so stable until the revolution is underway?,
3. Why did the January 28 - February 1, 2011, Internet shutdown in Egypt not have a greater inhibitory
effect on protests?, and
4. Why is it that some regimes fall in a matter of weeks, others fight to a stalemate, and still others
survive relatively unscathed?
Answering these four questions, among others, using a consistent and unified approach is not trivial given
the complexity of the situations in Arab Spring countries. Adding to the difficulty of such a task is the
impossibility of running counter-factual experiments to verify conclusions. However, the goal of this paper
is to show how mathematical modelling can be useful in this situation. It should be noted that models
of opinion/norm formation [Centola et al., 2005], conflict [Atkinson et al., 2011, Kress, 2012], and even
revolution [Kuran, 1991] already exist. However, these models either do not apply specifically to the Arab
Spring revolutions or are highly complex. Furthermore, although complex models may in principle be able
to offer a more complete description, they also have limitations. More detailed models typically require
additional assumptions and the calibration of a large number of parameters. This makes complex models
analytically intractable, difficult to interpret, and computationally expensive to simulate. In this paper we
attempt to create a simple model that is nevertheless able to capture essential features of Arab-Spring-type
revolutions, and also can be used to explore possible answers to the questions raised above.
We develop our model in Section 2 and provide an elementary mathematical analysis in Section 3. This is
followed by Section 4 which expands on the interpretation of our model by considering various case studies.
This section also explains how our model can help to find answers to the four questions posed above. Section
4.1 first describes the Arab Spring events in Tunisia, applying our model with parameters that are fixed for
the lifetime of the revolution. Next we consider the Egyptian revolution in Section 4.2, where we allow model
parameters to evolve over the course of the revolution in order to incorporate external influences. Finally,
Section 4.3 briefly discusses how our model can be applied to several other states, including Iran, China,
and Somalia. The paper is concluded in Section 5 with a summary of our findings and a discussion of future
work.
2 Simple Compartmental Model
In order to facilitate the development, interpretation, and analysis of our model we begin by stating it and
defining the terminology used in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 then provides the interpretation and justification of
each model term and parameter introduced in Section 2.1.
2.1 Statement of the Model
The function r(t) represents the fraction of protesters or revolutionaries in the population at time t. The
model which we use to describe the dynamics of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt is given by a single
differential equation for r(t),
r˙ = c1 v(r;α) (1− r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(r)
− c2 p(r;β) r︸ ︷︷ ︸
d(r)
, (1)
2According to Howard et al. [2011] approximately 25% of Tunisians and 10% of Egyptians had used the Internet at least
once prior to the Arab Spring.
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where parameters α, β ∈ (0, 1) and c1, c2 > 0, where x˙ denotes the time derivative of x, and where the
functions g, d : [0, 1]→ R+ are called the growth and decay terms, respectively, since they model the growth
and decay of the fraction of protesters.
Subject to the visibility term
v(r;α) =
{
1 if r > 1− α
0 otherwise.
the growth term is proportional to (1− r). We call the proportionality constant, c1, and the parameter,
α, the enthusiasm and visibility of the protesters, respectively. The visibility term is modelled as a step
function, which shuts off the growth term when the fraction of protesters is below the visibility threshold
1− α: in our model the fraction of protesters can only grow when the protest movement is sufficiently large
to be visible to the general population. Similarly, subject to the policing term
p(r;β) =
{
1 if r < β
0 otherwise.
the decay term is proportional to r. We call the proportionality constant, c2, and the threshold parameter,
β, the policing capacity and policing efficiency, respectively. The policing term is also modelled as a step
function: it shuts down the decay term when the fraction of protesters is above the policing capacity threshold,
β. The visibility and policing terms are illustrated in Figure 1.
(a) Visibility term, v(r;α) (b) Policing term, p(r;β)
Figure 1: Visibility (v(r;α)) and policing (p(r;β)) terms.
We observe from equation (1) and Figure 1 that if r = 0 or r = 1 then r˙ = 0, regardless of the values
chosen for the parameters. We say that r = 0 and r = 1 are the equilibria of total state control and of the
realized revolution, respectively. In what follows it will be shown how this model can describe the dynamics of
a revolutionary transition from a small initial group of protesters (r ≈ 0) to a full-blown revolution (r ≈ 1).
This is a simple model for revolutionary transitions, parametrized by the four parameters α, β, c1, and c2.
Now that we have established the terminology for our model we are able to provide a detailed interpretation
and justification in Section 2.2. This will allow us to proceed with Sections 3 and 4, which provide the
mathematical analysis of our model and application of the model to various case studies, respectively.
2.2 Interpretation and Justification of the Model
Here we explain and justify the model of (1) which describes the process by which citizens engage in
revolution, with the specific goal of gaining insight into the effect of enhanced communications technologies
3
The Arab Spring: A Simple Compartmental Model
[Howard et al., 2011, Lotan et al., 2011]. In order to arrive at a simple model some simplifying assumptions are
necessary. First, our model is developed for describing rapid revolutionary transitions on a short time scale
(of the order of months), and neglects demographic and other long-term effects. Second, we assume that the
regime is very unpopular and that all individuals would privately like to see the regime changed. The second
assumption allows us to divide the population into two compartments: the population participating/not
participating in the revolution. From the first assumption, the sum of both compartments is a constant and
the dynamics of one compartment completely determines the dynamics of the other, so it suffices to consider
a one-compartment model, see Figure 2. We choose to keep track of the population participating in the
revolution as a fraction of the total population, r(t). Note that the fraction of the population available to
join the revolution at time t is 1 − r(t), by the second assumption. We also note that the first assumption
is applied again in Sections 4.1-4.2 to identify reasonable values for the protester’s enthusiasm (c1) and the
regime’s policing efficiency (c2). It remains to justify our choice of functional form for g(r) and d(r) in (1).
Par$cipa$ng	  in	  Revolu$on	  
r(t)	  
Not	  Par$cipa$ng	  in	  Revolu$on	  
1	  -­‐	  r(t)	  
Figure 2: Simple compartmental model for the dynamics of a revolution.
We assume that the regime is capable of arresting/dispersing protesters at a rate proportional to the size
of the revolution, r, provided that the number of protesters does not exceed the regime’s finite policing
capacity, β. Provided that no new protesters join the revolution (v = 0) and that the number of protesters
does not exceed the regime’s policing capacity (p = 1), this corresponds to exponential decay in the number
of protesters with the timescale determined by the policing efficiency, c2. We make the further simplifying
assumption that the regime loses all ability to punish protesters once the number of protesters exceeds the
regime’s policing capacity. These assumptions determine the form of p(r;β) as a switching function.
Dictatorial regimes are known to keep tight control on the flow of political information through state
control of the media and through censorship, and for a good reason [Centola et al., 2005, Dunn, 2011, Husain
and Pollack, 2011, Khamis and Vaughn, 2011, Kuran, 1991]: if political protests are kept hidden from the
general population, protest movements have little chance of growing. We model this effect by the visibility
term, v(r;α), and we make the simple assumption that the visibility term can be modelled as a step function.
As soon as the fraction of protesters reaches the visibility threshold, 1− α, and is large enough to be visible
to the general population, the revolution is assumed to grow with a growth term proportional to 1− r. Note
that we call α the visibility and 1−α the visibility threshold: for large visibility, e.g. α = 0.96, the visibility
threshold is low, 1−α = 0.04, so the general population will become aware of the political protest movement
as soon as it has spread to 4% of the population. One of the goals of this paper is to investigate how the
increased presence of Internet, social media, satellite television, and cell phones may enhance the spread
of revolutionary movements. Indeed, these effects may significantly loosen the control of the regime over
the flow of politically sensitive information, and in our model the influence of new media can be taken into
account by an increased visibility parameter, α. Note also that, provided the revolution is visible (v = 1) and
exceeds the policing capacity (p = 0), the growth rate is proportional to 1− r with the timescale determined
by the protesters’ enthusiasm, c1.
As a secondary motivation for the step-function form of v(r;α) one can also consider the following. Given
the policing limitations of the regime, the decision of individuals whether or not to act is a collective action
problem [Kuran, 1991]. Thus, the case can be made that the most important factor for individuals deciding
to join a revolution is the perceived size of the revolution. If individuals perceive participation in a revolution
to be below a certain threshold they will refuse to join the revolution and risk punishment, despite their
4
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desire to see the regime fall. Conversely, above this threshold an individual’s desire to see the regime fall
overpowers their fear of government reprisal.
Due to the simplicity of our four-parameter model it is unable to capture singular one-time events such as
the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010. Although these types of events could be
modelled stochastically, to keep our model as simple as possible we introduce the concept of shocks. A shock
is an event external to our model which nevertheless has an effect on the fraction of revolutionaries (r) either
directly, or indirectly via a change in the parameters α, β, c1, or c2. Specifically, we consider direct shocks
that produce an instantaneous jump in r, denoted ∆r, and indirect shocks that trigger an instantaneous or
continuous change in one or more parameters of the model. A shock of this type to α, for example, would be
specified by defining α(t). for simplicity we restrict our attention to instant or linear changes in parameters.
In Section 4 we will discuss how our model can be applied in the case studies of the Tunisian and Egyptian
revolutions, and the situations in Iran, China, and Somalia. Before embarking on this study, however,
Section 3 provides a mathematical analysis of our model. We find that the parameter space of the model
can essentially be divided into four regions, which we name regions II, III0, IIIe, and III1 (see Figure 3), and
which we will interpret in terms of the dynamic stability of the model solutions in those parameter regions.
In anticipation of the case studies of Section 4, Figure 3 gives a conceptual indication of how the cases of
Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, China, and Somalia can be described by our model using parameter choices in specific
parts of the parameter space.
Figure 3: Division of α−β parameter space into regions II, IIIe, III0, and III1. Conceptual summary of case
studies of Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, China, and Somalia.
The assumptions made in developing our model are crude, but as illustrated by the analysis and case
studies presented below, they apply sufficiently well to some of the Arab Spring revolutions that they can be
used to formulate a simple model that captures some essential features of these revolutions. In particular, we
emphasize that our model focuses specifically on the types of rapid transitions that have characterized the
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and that all individuals would privately like to see the regime change. It is
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clear that there are countries for which these assumptions and the resulting model do not apply, as discussed
in Section 5 on future work.
3 Elementary Mathematical Analysis of the Model
The mathematical analysis of the dynamics of the model given in (1) breaks down into three distinct cases
characterized by regions in the α− β plane: α+ β = 1, α+ β < 1, and α+ β > 1, which are summarized in
Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively. An interpretation for these cases is given at the end of this section and in
subsequent sections.
Region I: α+ β = 1
When r < β = 1 − α we have v(r;α) = 0 and p(r;β) = 1, so r = 0 is a locally asymptotically stable
equilibrium with basin of attraction (0, β). Similarly, when r > β = 1 − α we have v(r;α) = 1 and
p(r;β) = 0, so r = 1 is also a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium with basin of attraction (1 − α, 1).
Finally, because v(1− α;α) = p(β;β) = 0 it follows that r = β = 1− α is a locally unstable equilibrium.
0 1 β 
1-α 
Figure 4: Region I with α + β = 1. Closed (open) circles represent locally asymptotically stable (unstable)
equilibria. Left (right) arrows indicate regions where r˙ < 0 (r˙ > 0).
Region II: α+ β < 1
As above, r = 0 and r = 1 are locally asymptotically stable equilibria with basins of attraction (0, β) and
(1 − α, 1), respectively. When r ∈ [β, 1 − α] we have v(r;α) = p(r;β) = 0, so all r ∈ (β, 1 − α) are locally
stable equilibria and r ∈ {β, 1− α} are unstable equilibria.
0 1 β 1-α 
Figure 5: Region II with α+ β < 1. Closed (open) circles represent locally asymptotically stable (unstable)
equilibria. The thick line in (β, 1− α) indicates stable equilibria. Left (right) arrows indicate regions where
r˙ < 0 (r˙ > 0).
Region III: α+ β > 1
Analogously to the previous two cases, we have the locally asymptotically stable equilibria r = 0 and r = 1
with basins of attraction (0, 1−α] and [β, 1), respectively. Restricting our attention to the interval (1−α, β)
and solving the algebraic equation r˙ = 0 gives r = c1c1+c2 . We define c
∗ = c1c1+c2 and observe that our analysis
breaks down into a further three sub-cases.
Region IIIe: If c1c1+c2 ∈ (1 − α, β) then there exists a third equilibrium r = c1c1+c2 and this equilibrium is
locally asymptotically stable with basin of attraction (1− α, β).
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Region III0: If c1c1+c2 < 1− α then the region (1− α, β) lies in the basin of attraction of r = 0.
Region III1: If c1c1+c2 > β then the region (1− α, β) lies in the basin of attraction of r = 1.
0 1 β 1-α 
r=c* 
(a) Region IIIe with α+ β > 1 and c∗ ∈ (1− α, β)
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
(b) Region III0 with α+ β > 1 and c∗ < 1− α
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
(c) Region III1 with α+ β > 1 and c∗ > β
Figure 6: Regions IIIe, III0 and III1. Closed (open) circles represent locally asymptotically stable (unstable)
equilibria. Left (right) arrows indicate regions where r˙ < 0 (r˙ > 0).
The above results are summarized in Figure 3, which illustrates the relationship between regions II, IIIe,
III0, and III1 in the α−β plane. Region I, because it is one-dimensional, is unlikely to manifest itself and so
we mostly disregard it in what follows. For the remaining regions we now introduce terminology to ease future
discussion. States with parameters in region II have uncountably many stable equilibria. These equilibria
occur because the policing capacity of the regime is too low to clear the protesters and the visibility is too
low to attract new protesters. We therefore interpret region II as corresponding to a failed state. Regions
III0, IIIe, and III1 differ only in the stability of the interval (1−α, β). For region III0 the interval (1−α, β)
lies in the basin of attraction of total state control (r = 0). Because of the contribution of (1 − α, β) to
the stability of the regime, we refer to region III0 as a stable police state. Analogously, we refer to region
III1 as an unstable police state. Region IIIe introduces an intermediate state, r = c∗, which lies between the
equilibria of total state control (r = 0) and of the realized revolution (r = 1). We therefore refer to r = c∗ as
the equilibrium of civil unrest and to region IIIe as a meta-stable police state.
Solutions to the model with parameters in the failed state (region II) are relatively straightforward, because
for any value of r ∈ [0, 1] at most one of the visibility (v(r;α)) or policing (p(r;β)) terms is “switched on”.
Behaviour of solutions with parameters in the stable police state, meta-stable police state, and unstable police
state (regions III0, IIIe, and III1, respectively) are less obvious, because for parameters in these regions we
have v(r;α) = 1 and p(r;β) = 1 whenever r ∈ (1− α, β). Therefore, in order to facilitate the interpretation
of our model, the case studies of Section 4 will provide sample time traces of solutions to our model for
parameters in regions III0, IIIe, and III1.
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4 Interpretation
Section 3 provided a mathematical analysis for our model. However, before we proceed with the case studies
of Tunisia and Egypt it will be useful to identify some reasonable values for the protesters’ enthusiasm (c1)
and the policing efficiency of the regime (c2). Since we have assumed that the revolutions occur as rapid
transitions over a on a short time scale (on the order of months), we take as our guide the observed time scales
in the revolutions we want to model. In the absence of government repression (p = 0) and with visibility
(v = 1) we assume that the revolution would spread to 90% of the population within one month for the types
of revolutions we want to study3. Measuring time in months and solving the equation r˙ = c1(1 − r) with
conditions r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 0.9 implies
c1 = log(10) ≈ 2.30.
Similarly, in the absence of new revolutionary recruits (v = 0) and with perfect policing capacity of the
regime (p = 1) we assume that to clear 90% of revolutionaries would take one day4. Again measuring time
in months and solving r˙ = −c2r with r(0) = r0 and r( 130 ) = 0.1 r0 implies
c2 = 30 log(10) ≈ 69.1.
We are now prepared to consider how our model might be applied to the two Arab Spring revolutions of
Tunisia (Section 4.1) and Egypt (Section 4.2). We also consider how the situations in Iran, China, and Somalia
might fit into the framework developed above (Section 4.3). Sections 4.1-4.3 together provide examples of
regimes fitting each of the parameter regions of our model: the failed, stable police, meta-stable police, and
unstable polices states, as was summarized in Figure 3. Furthermore, by the end of Section 4.3 we will have
seen how our model might be applied to address the four questions posed in Section 1.
4.1 Case Study: Tunisia
The Arab Spring had its first manifestation in the Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia where the Internet, and
in particular social media (i.e Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, etc...), is credited as a catalyst facilitating regime
change [Howard et al., 2011, Pollock, 2011, Stepanova, 2011]. Below, we apply the above model in an attempt
to better understand how social media may have influenced the revolution.
Internet, social media, satellite TV, and cell phone communications technologies may empower protesters
by enhancing their
(1) capacity for organization and coordination [Beckett, 2011, Husain and Pollack, 2011, Pollock, 2011],
(2) ability to assess the current public support for the revolution [Alterman, 2011, Husain and Pollack,
2011, Khamis and Vaughn, 2011, Pollock, 2011, Saletan, 2011, Zhuo et al., 2011], and
(3) awareness of the nature and severity of government repression [Husain and Pollack, 2011, Schneider,
2011].
These and related effects enter into our model via the visibility (α) and enthusiasm (c1) parameters in
the growth term of the model. Thus, before considering how our model might be applied to the specific
circumstances of the Tunisian revolution, we elaborate on the three points brought up above.
3There were 29 days between Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17, 2010, and Ben Ali’s resignation in Tunisia
on January 14, 2011 and 18 days between the January 25, 2011, Tahrir Square protests and Mubarak’s resignation in Egypt on
February 11, 2011 [Howard et al., 2011, Husain and Pollack, 2011, Alterman, 2011]. Of course, there is no way to determine
(a) the exact start date for the revolutions in Egypt or Tunisia, (b) how many people had joined these revolutions by the fall of
the regimes, or (c) how these revolutions would have proceeded in the absence of government repression. Nevertheless, spread
of support of the revolution to 90% of the population in one month seems to be at least within the correct order of magnitude.
4Again, this is only a crude order-of-magnitude estimate based on the fact that Egyptian forces managed to clear Tahrir
Square in approximately 24 hours after the January 25th protests began [Husain and Pollack, 2011].
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As we discussed in Section 2, the decision of whether or not to protest is largely a coordination problem
[Kuran, 1991]. If individuals protest individually then the state is capable of severe retaliation, however,
if individuals protest in sufficient numbers then the state loses its ability to punish. This realization lead
activists to use the Internet to coordinate the initial protests in Tunis [Husain and Pollack, 2011, Pollock,
2011]. Once protests were underway, technologies such as SMS and Twitter messaging were used between
co-revolutionaries, for example by communicating which streets were the most/least obstructed by security
forces [Husain and Pollack, 2011]. This enhances the speed with which revolutionaries mobilize, and in the
context of our model this corresponds to an increased enthusiasm of the revolutionaries (c1). Social media
and the Internet also contributed to the relatively leaderless way in which the Tunisian revolution developed.
Contrasting to revolutions with a more hierarchical leadership structure, a leaderless revolution is difficult
if not impossible to disrupt by targeting only a handful of individuals [Beckett, 2011, Husain and Pollack,
2011]. This also corresponds to an increased c1.
In our model growth of the revolution is subject to the visibility switching term, v(r;α). The revolution
can only grow when it is visible, i.e. when r > 1 − α. Through censorship dictatorial regimes attempt to
control protests by ensuring that they remain virtually invisible to the general population. In other words,
in order to prevent growth of small protests into larger movements the regime will attempt to keep the
visibility (α) low, and the visibility threshold (1−α) high. As a consequence, the general population remains
unaware of, and hence incapable of joining, small protests. The Internet, social media, satellite TV, and cell
phones all work towards increasing α by disrupting the regime’s monopoly on the distribution of information.
In Tunisia the Internet and social media created a virtual space where Tunisians could express their true
opinions with minimal censorial oversight or fear of reprisal [Husain and Pollack, 2011, Khamis and Vaughn,
2011, Pollock, 2011]. Critically, this new interconnectivity allowed Tunisians to better gage the true level of
support for regime change. Together with cell phones, social media sites vastly sped up the speed with which
information travelled, allowing Tunisians - and the entire world - to follow the revolution with unprecedented
detail and speed [Lotan et al., 2011, Saletan, 2011, Zhuo et al., 2011]. Traditonal media lent its credibility
to this new wellspring of information by corroborating and then rebroadcasting stories relating to the size of
the revolution and the regime’s brutal response [Alterman, 2011].
Awareness of the brutality and severity of the government’s reaction may increase both the visibility of
protesters, α, as well as their enthusiasm, c1. The enthusiasm for the revolution may be directly affected by
increasing resentment of the regime. In contrast, the effect on α is likely to be through a secondary chanel.
Specifically, otherwise apolitical individuals are induced to join the revolution [Husain and Pollack, 2011,
Schneider, 2011], presumably by lowering their personal thresholds for participation.
We now have an idea of how the Internet, social media, satellite TV, and cell phones might influence the
parameters of our model, specifically the visibility (α) and enthusiasm (c1) parameters in the growth term.
Next we present a simplified timeline of major events during the Tunisian revolution [Blight et al., 2012,
Howard et al., 2011, Husain and Pollack, 2011, Rifai, 2011].
• December 17, 2010: Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolates in the city of Sidi Bouzid.
• December 18, 2010: Protests erupt in Sidi Bouzid. Protesters begin recording and uploading videos of
the protests and police response to the Internet.
• December 22, 2010: Houcine Falhi commits suicide by electrocution in the midst of a demonstration in
Sidi Bouzid.
• December 27 - 28, 2010: Protests break out in the capital, Tunis. President Ben Ali denounces protests
in televised address.
• January 5, 2011: Mohamed Bouazizi dies from burn injuries.
• January 14 - 15, 2011: Ben Ali resigns and flees to Saudi Arabia. Interim government formed.
• January 17 - 24, 2011: Protests continue increasing in size to 40,000 - 100,000 individuals.
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• Februrary 27, 2011: Protest of at least 100,000 Tunisians forces Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi
to resign.
Our model can now be applied to show how an increase in α and/or c1 might increase the likelihood
of a successful revolution. Given the many decades of stability within Tunisia before the revolution, we
assume that the situation pre-Internet is best described by parameters in the stable police state (region III0,
c∗ < 1 − α). To see clearly how increasing visibility (α) or enthusiasm (c1) of protesters then affects the
dynamics of our model we now consider varying these parameters separately at first, starting with α. At
first an increasing α leaves the basin of attraction of the total state control equilibrium (r = 0) unchanged,
and hence, has no impact on the overall stability of the regime. However, once α > 1 − c∗ the regime
passes from the stable police state (region III0) to the meta-stable police state (region IIIe), the basin of
attraction for total state control equilibrium shrinks from (0, β) to (0, 1− α], and the locally asymptotically
stable civil unrest equilibrium (r = c∗) is created with basin of attraction (1− α, β), see Figure 7a. The size
of the perturbation required to leave the basin of attraction of the total state control equilibrium has thus
been decreased. As α continues to increase, the basin of attraction of the civil unrest equilibrium grows.
Depending on the value of β and c∗, α may be able to grow to the point that a revolution succeeding, i.e.
leaving the basin of attraction of the civil unrest equilibrium for that of the realized revolution (r = 1),
requires a smaller perturbation than the revolution being crushed, i.e. leaving the civil unrest equilibrium
for the basin of attraction of total state control, see Figure 7a. So, increasing α (a) first moves us into the
meta-stable police state (region IIIe), thus decreasing the size of the perturbation needed to leave total state
control (r = 0), and then (b) decreases the relative likelihood of a revolution dying out (returning to r = 0
from r = c∗) as opposed to succeeding (leaving r = c∗ for r = 1).
Again starting from a stable police state (region III0), we consider the effect of increasing enthusiasm of
protesters (c1), see Figure 7b. For c1 < β the effect of increasing c1 is qualitatively similar to increasing
α. Specifically, increasing c1 has no effect on the basin of attraction of total state control (r = 0) until
c∗ > 1 − α (α > 1 − c∗) at which point the regime moves from the stable police state (region III0) to the
meta-stable police state (region IIIe), with effects as described above. As c1 increases with c
∗ in the region
(1 − α, β), the equilibrium of civil unrest (r = c∗) moves farther from the basin of attraction of total state
control and closer to the basin of attraction of the realized revolution (r = 1). The effects are, again, as
above. Further increasing c1 such that c
∗ surpasses β produces the qualitatively distinct effect of moving
from the meta-stable police state (region IIIe) to the unstable police state (region III1). The equilibrium
of civil unrest disappears and the basin of attraction of the realized revolution is extended from (β, 1) to
(1− α, 1).
Another way to visualize the information presented in Figure 7 is to plot time traces of solutions to (1) for
different choices of parameters. The perturbations mentioned above, which are required to move from the
basin of attraction of one equilibrium to another, are delivered by shocks to the fraction of revolutionaries
(∆r). Specifically, although one shock of sufficient magnitude would perturb a solution from total state
control (r = 0) to the basin of attraction of the realized revolution (r = 1), we choose to consider a scenario
with two smaller shocks. This is because the probability of a shock likely decreases rapidly with the its
magnitude, and therefore, we are significantly more likely to encounter two smaller shocks as opposed to
one large shock. In fact, the two shocks are chosen to coincide with the self-immolation (December 17,
2010) and death (January 5, 2011) of Mohamed Bouazizi which, respectively, set in motion the Tunisian
revolution and immediately preceded a spike in online conversations about freedom and revolution [Howard
et al., 2011] in the lead-up to the resignation of President Ben Ali (January 14, 2011). Using this time scale,
Ben Ali resigns at t = 2930 . In keeping with the calculations done at the beginning of Section 4, we choose
c2 = 30 log(10) ≈ 69.1. Figure 8 shows the effect of increasing α by solving (1) with
α = {0.96, 0.98}, β ∈ {0.05, 0.06}, c1 = 2.30 (c∗ ≈ 0.0322), r(0) = 0,
and subject to shocks ∆r1 = 0.021 and ∆r2 = 0.021 occurring on December 17, 2010, (t =
1
30 ) and
January 5, 2011, (t = 2030 ), respectively. Figure 9 demonstrates the effect of increasing c1 by solving (1) with
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0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
III0 
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
IIIe 
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
IIIe 
(a) Increasing α: While α < 1 − c∗, increasing α
has no effect on the basin of attraction of either
r = 0 or r = 1. Once α > 1− c∗, r = c∗ becomes
a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium, thus
reducing the size of a perturbation required to
leave the basin of attraction of r = 0. Finally, as
α becomes large enough the perturbation needed
to return to r = 0 from r = c∗ becomes larger
than the one required to proceed from r = c∗ to
r = 1, and the perturbation required to leave the
basin of attraction of r = 0 becomes increasingly
small.
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
III0 
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
IIIe 
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
III1 
(b) Increasing c1: Increasing c1 has no effect on
the basin of attraction of either r = 0 or r = 1
until α > 1 − c∗, when r = c∗ becomes a lo-
cally asymptotically stable equilibrium. As c∗ ap-
proaches β the equilibrium r = c∗ becomes farther
from (closer to) to the basin of attraction of r = 0
(r = 1). As a result, the size of a perturbation re-
quired to leave r = c∗ for r = 0 (r = 1) increases
(decreases) as c∗ increases. Finally, as c∗ > β the
equilibrium r = c∗ disappears and the basin of
attraction of r = 1 becomes (1− α, 1).
Figure 7: The effect of increasing α and c1 on the existence and stability of equilibria.
α = 0.96, β = 0.06, c1 ∈ {2.30, 3.26, 4.02, 4.80} (c∗ ∈ {0.0322, 0.0451, 0.0550, 0.0650}),
and subject to shocks ∆r3 = 0.041 and ∆r4 = 0.01 occurring on December 17, 2010, (t =
1
30 ) and January
5, 2011, (t = 2030 ), respectively.
As with Figure 7a, Figure 8 illustrates how the dynamics of the model change as α increases. Because
solutions shown in Figure 8a have parameters in the stable police state (region III0), leaving the basin of
attraction of total state control (r = 0) requires a shock ∆r > β. Thus, the solutions in Figure 8a decaying
to total state control is consistent with ∆r1 = ∆r2 = 0.021 < β for both β = 0.05 and β = 0.06. Increasing
the visibility from α = 0.96 to α = 0.98 decreases the basin of attraction of total state control and yields
Figure 8b. In this case, the shock ∆r1 is sufficient to move solutions from total state control to the basin
of attraction of civil unrest (r = c∗). However, as we saw in Figure 7a, for a second shock to perturb the
solution from civil unrest to the basin of attraction of the realized revolution (r = 1) requires ∆r > β − c∗.
This is the case for β = 0.05 but not β = 0.06.
Similar to Figure 7, Figure 9 illustrates how the dynamics of the model change as c1 increases. Figure
9a shares the same parameters as Figure 8a and shows solutions in the stable police state (region III0) for
which the two shocks, now taken with strength ∆r3 = 0.041 and ∆r4 = 0.01, are insufficient to leave the
basin of attraction of total state control (r = 0). As the enthusiasm of protesters increases from c1 = 2.30
(c∗ = 0.0322) to c1 = 3.26 (c∗ = 0.0451) we go from a stable police state to a meta-stable police state (region
IIIe). This situation is illustrated in Figure 9b, where ∆r3 = 0.041 is now sufficient to move the solution
from total state control to the basin of attraction of civil unrest (r = c∗), however, ∆r4 is still too small
relative to β− c∗ to perturb the solution from civil unrest to the basin of attraction of the realized revolution
(r = 1), i.e. ∆r4 < β − c∗. Continuing to increase the enthusiasm parameter to c1 = 4.02 (c∗ = 0.0550)
maintains parameters in the meta-stable police state. Here the magnitude of a shock needed to leave total
state control for the basin of attraction of civil unrest remains unchanged, whereas the magnitude of a shock
needed to perturb a solution from civil unrest to the basin of attraction of the realized revolution is decreased.
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(a) Stable police state (region III0) with α = 0.96. (b) Meta-stable police state (region IIIe) with α = 0.98
Figure 8: The effect of increasing α on the behaviour of solutions to (1) with β ∈ {0.05, 0.06}, c1 = 2.30,
c2 = 30 log(10), and subject to shocks ∆r1 = ∆r2 = 0.021 occurring at t =
1
30 (December 17, 2010) and
t = 2030 (January 5, 2011). Panel (b) with β = 0.05 corresponds qualitatively to Figure 2 of Howard et al.
[2011].
This is illustrated in Figure 9c, where ∆r4 is now sufficient to propel the solution from civil unrest to the
basin of attraction of the realized revolution. Finally, Figure 9d shows the situation where further increased
enthusiasm, c1 = 4.80 (c
∗ = 0.0650), has moved parameters from a meta-stable police state to an unstable
police state (region III1). Observe that for the unstable police state the shock ∆r3 is sufficient on its own to
move the solution from total state control to the basin of attraction of the realized revolution.
We summarize findings from Figures 7-9 by observing that (a) an increase in visibility (α) decreases the
size of shock needed to leave total state control (r = 0) for the basin of attraction of civil unrest (r = c∗), and
(b) an increase in enthusiasm (c1) decreases the size of the shock needed to leave civil unrest for the basin of
attraction of the realized revolution (r = 1). Indeed, for sufficiently high c1 (c
∗) no second shock is needed
at all. When considering a revolution, however, we must consider effects of both visibility and enthusiasm
simultaneously, because as discussed above we expect the Internet and social media to increase both α and
c1.
When comparing the plots in Figures 8b and 9c to data presented in Figure 2 of Howard et al. [2011]5 we find
a qualitative match. Howard’s Figure 2 shows an initial increase in posts related to the economy following
Mohamed Bouazizi’s self immolation starting on December 17, 2010, which is sustained until Mohamed
Bouazizi’s death on January 5, 2011, when we see the start of a second increase in posts related to Ben Ali.
This second increase peaks on January 14, 2011, when Ben Ali resigns. Howard et al. [2011] observes that
street protests continued well after the departure of Ben Ali until at least the resignation of Prime Minister
Mohamed Ghannouchi on February 27, 2011. This appears consistent with the behaviour in Figures 8b
and 9c where we see an initial spike leading to sustained engagement and a second spike leading to full-on
revolution that continues to gain momentum well after the January 14, 2011, (t = 1) resignation of Ben Ali.
Now that we have a better understanding of how adoption of the Internet and social media may factor
into our model, let us consider aspects of the Jasmine revolution that we can investigate using our model by
addressing the following two questions.
1. How can a small number of active social media users and relatively low Internet penetration have a
dramatic effect on the stability of a regime?, and
2. How is it that regimes manage to seem so stable until the revolution is underway?
5This figure is captioned “Percent of Tunisian Blogs With Posts on Politics, By Keyword”.
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(a) Stable police state (III0) with c1 = 2.30. (b) Meta-stable police state (IIIe) with c1 = 3.26.
(c) Meta-stable police state (IIIe) with c1 = 4.02. (d) Unstable police state (III1) with c1 = 4.80
Figure 9: The effect of increasing c1 on the behaviour of solutions to (1) with α = 0.96, β = 0.06, c2 =
30 log(10), and subject to shocks ∆r3 = 0.041 and ∆r4 = 0.01 occurring at t =
1
30 (December 17, 2010) and
t = 2030 (January 5, 2011). Panel (c) corresponds qualitatively to Figure 2 of Howard et al. [2011].
Question 1: To explain how only a small number of social media users can have a significant impact on
the likelihood of a full-blown revolution, consider the effect of the Internet and social media usage solely on
visibility (α). In the example of Figure 8 a small increase from α = 0.96 to α = 0.98 reduces the size of shock
in r necessary to leave total state control (r = 0) from ∆r = 0.04 to ∆r = 0.02. If shocks occur distributed
according to some probability distribution, then it is reasonable to assume that shocks of sufficient magnitude
to mobilize large fractions of the population lie in the tail of this distribution. For many reasonable probability
distributions satisfying this criterion, halving the size of shock necessary to trigger a revolution more (and
potentially much more) than doubles the likelihood of a revolution occurring in any given amount of time.
Compounding this phenomenon is how, when α initially increases beyond 1 − c∗, the basin of attraction of
total state control (r = 0) shrinks from (0, β) to (0, 1−α] in a discontinuous fashion. So, a small increase in α
can have a very large impact on the expected amount of time one has to wait until a revolution is triggered.
Question 2: Increasing either enthusiasm (c1) or visibility (α) eventually decreases the size of the basin of
attraction of total state control (r = 0). This undermines the regime by decreasing the size of shock necessary
to trigger a revolution. However, since (a) r = 0 always remains a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium,
(b) large shocks are exceedingly rare, and (c) determining the exact values of the parameters in a model like
ours is very difficult, the exact size of shock necessary to trigger a revolution is impossible to determine until
such a shock occurs. It follows that for someone observing a regime before and after the adoption of social
media there would be few, if any, outward signs of instability: the regime appears stable until it isn’t.
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4.2 Case Study: Egypt
In applying our model to the Tunisian case study we included no factors external to the model, other
than shocks to the number of protesters, r. This was sufficient to produce a qualitative match between the
development of the Tunisian revolution and the model. In the case of the Egyptian revolution, however, there
are certain singular events not captured by our model that would have a significant effect on the parameters
of the model. For example,
(a) news of a successful revolution in Tunisia likely raised the enthusiasm (c1) and visibility (α) parameters
in Egypt by causing Egyptians to discuss and re-evaluate the strengths (and weaknesses) of the regime,
the discontent of the general population, and their chances of success [Husain and Pollack, 2011, Pollock,
2011, Zhuo et al., 2011],
(b) the intervention of the Egyptian military on behalf of protesters in Tahrir Square [Husain and Pol-
lack, 2011, Said, 2012] likely lowered policing capacity (β) and efficiency (c2) directly by immediately
curtailing the regime’s policing capacity, and
(c) the January 28 - February 1, 2011 Internet disruptions [Dunn, 2011, Howard et al., 2011, Husain and
Pollack, 2011] lowered the visibility (α) temporarily.
This suggests to consider changes in the model parameters during the course of the revolution. First we
establish the following rough timeline [Blight et al., 2012, Dunn, 2011, Husain and Pollack, 2011, Howard
et al., 2011, Pollock, 2011, Said, 2012].
• December 17, 2010: Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolates in Tunisia.
• January 14 - 15, 2011: Ben Ali flees Tunisia and an interim government is established.
• January 25, 2011: Day of Protest in Tahrir Square, Egypt.
• January 26, 2011: Police clear Tahrir Square.
• January 28, 2011: Protesters occupy Tahrir Square, Mubarak addresses nation, major Internet disrup-
tions begin.
• February 1, 2011: President Obama withdraws support for Mubarak regime, army refuses to act against
protesters, major Internet disruptions end.
• February 2, 2011: State vandals and thugs attack protesters in Tahrir Square, army officers intervene
on behalf of protesters.
• February 11, 2011: Mubarak resigns.
We now outline a possible interpretation for the revolution in Egypt according to our model. The events
of January 14-15 likely increased both α and c1 but not by enough to move Egypt from a stable (region III0)
to a meta-stable (region IIIe) police state. Because the initial shock of the Day of Protest on January 25 is of
insufficient magnitude to perturb the system from total state control (r = 0) to the basin of attraction of the
realized revolution (r = 1), i.e. the magnitude of the shock is less than β, Egyptian police are able to clear
Tahrir Square. Nevertheless, this initial protest is sufficiently large to generate considerable coverage on both
social and traditional media [Alterman, 2011, Howard et al., 2011, Zhuo et al., 2011]. An increased awareness
in the general population of the current level of dissatisfaction with the regime through increased consultation
of Internet and satellite TV sources then resulted in a further increase of α. In addition, protesters’ initial
success leads to increased enthusiasm and experience which may increase c1. At some point between January
25 and 28 Egypt becomes a meta-stable police state and the revolution converges to the equilibrium of civil
unrest (r = c∗). Meanwhile, Internet disruptions between January 28 and February 1 temporarily suppress
α. Finally, the decisions made by the army in favor of the protesters on February 1-2 lower both β and c2.
Egypt then becomes an unstable police state (region III1) and the revolution proceeds to completion without
the need of a second shock. We illustrate this scenario in Figure 10 where t = 0 is taken to be January
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14, r(0) = 0, parameters6 are given in Table 1 and in equations (2a)-(2d), and the initial shock occurs on
January 25 (t = 1130 ) with ∆r = 0.05.
Date Time (t) Event Parameters Affected Region
Jan. 14-15 0 to 130 · Ben Ali resigns and an · Set α and c1 to III0
interim government is α = 0.96 and c1 = 2.30
formed in Tunisia · Initially β = 0.06 and
c2 = 69.1
Jan. 25 1130 · Day of Protest in Tahrir Square · Shock to r of ∆r = 0.05 III0
Jan. 25-28 1140 to
14
30 · Lead up to Jan. 28 protest · Increase α and c1 III0 - IIIe
(linearly) to α = 0.98
and c1 = 3.26
Jan. 28 - Feb. 2 1440 to
19
30 · Temporary Internet · Suppress7α from IIIe
disruptions α = 0.98 to α = 0.96
Feb. 1-2 1830 to
19
30 · Army intervenes on behalf · Decrease7 β and c2 to IIIe - III1
of protesters β = 0.04 and c2 = 50.0
Table 1: Significant events during the Egyptian revolution and their impact on parameters α, β, c1, and c2.
The parameter profiles as a function of time are described in the text and are plotted in Figure 10.
6Parameters are chosen so that they conform with the scenario presented above, but their precise values are chosen rather
arbitrarily within these constraints for this proof-of-concept scenario analysis. We do not make any attempt to model the
time-dependence of the parameters explicitly.
7Transitions are assumed to occur linearly over the period of one day.
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The parameter profiles are given as a function of time by
α(t) =

0.96 0 ≤ t < 1130 Prior to Jan. 25
0.96 14−30t3 + 0.98
30t−11
3
11
30 ≤ t < 1430 Jan. 25-28
0.98(15− 30t) + 0.96(30t− 14) 1430 ≤ t < 1530 Jan. 28-29
0.96 1530 ≤ t < 1830 Jan. 29 - Feb. 1
0.96(19− 30t) + 0.98(30t− 18) 1830 ≤ t < 1930 Feb. 1-2
0.98 t ≥ 1930 Feb. 2 onwards
, (2a)
c1(t) =
 2.30 0 ≤ t <
11
30 Prior to Jan. 25
2.30 14−30t3 + 3.26
30t−11
3
11
30 ≤ t < 1430 Jan. 25-28
3.26 t ≥ 1430 Jan. 28 onwards
, (2b)
β(t) =
 0.06 0 ≤ t <
18
30 Prior to Feb. 1
0.06(19− 30t) + 0.04(30t− 18) 1830 ≤ t < 1930 Feb. 1 - 2
0.04 t ≥ 1930 Feb. 2 onwards
, and (2c)
c2(t) =
 69.1 0 ≤ t <
18
30 Prior to Feb. 1
69.1(19− 30t) + 50.0(30t− 18) 1830 ≤ t < 1930 Feb. 1 - 2
50.0 t ≥ 1930 Feb. 2 onwards
. (2d)
Figure 10: A possible scenario modelling the Egyptian revolution using dynamic parameters and an initial
shock. The model solution corresponds qualitatively to Figure 4 of Howard et al. [2011].
As in the previous case study of Tunisia, the model scenario illustrated by Figure 10 agrees qualitatively
with observed data, in particular the data presented in Figure 4 of Howard et al. [2011]8, which shows rapid
growth in Tweets related to the Egyptian revolution culminating in a spike of Twitter activity on January
8This figure is captioned “Logged Number of Tweets on #egypt, by Location”.
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25. After this spike, activity declines and then stabilizes between January 25 and January 28. Finally, after
restrictions on the Internet are lifted on February 1 there is rapid growth in Twitter activity until Mubarak
resigns on February 11. Figure 10 shows that our model is again capable of generating behaviour observed
in Howard et al. [2011].
We take this opportunity to address the third question posed in Section 1,
3. Why did the January 28 - February 1 Internet shutdown in Egypt not have a greater inhibitory effect
on protests?
Question 3: In our model, attempting to suppress a revolution by reducing its visibility (α) will only be
successful if the regime can make the visibility threshold (1−α) greater than the current size of the revolution.
Figure 10 illustrates the scenario where the regime fails in its attempt to suppress a revolution because it
does not manage to sufficiently decrease visibility of protesters. Thus, the January 28 - February 1 Internet
shutdown had little effect on the ongoing protests because the protests had become sufficiently large that
individuals no longer needed the Internet to be aware of them. We make the additional observation that,
with respect to the example of Figure 10, increasing β might prevent the transition from a meta-stable police
state (region IIIe) to an unstable police state (region III1), but would not prevent the transition from a stable
police state (region III0) to a meta-stable police state. As such, according to our model, the regime is not able
to regain total state control (r = 0) by increasing its policing capacity, β. The only other option open to the
regime to suppress the revolution would be to decrease c∗ by increasing its policing efficiency (c2). Increasing
policing efficiency rapidly is difficult, however, because improving training of security forces, intelligence,
investments in infrastructure and crowd control, etc... take a significant amount of time. Moreover, as we
discussed in Section 4.1 attempting to increase policing efficiency by use of police brutality risks being exposed
by new media, thus inducing otherwise apolitical individuals to join the revolution [Husain and Pollack, 2011,
Schneider, 2011].
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 have presented ways in which our model can be applied to the revolutions of Tunisia
and Egypt. These two case studies have shown how our model, taking into account only the visibility of
protesters and policing capacity of the regime, can produce results that are qualitatively consistent with
observations and data presented in Howard et al. [2011]. This indicates that the visibility of protesters and
policing capacity of the regime may be essential factors for the dynamics of the Arab Spring revolutions.
Since the visibility of protesters is primarily affected by media and communications technologies, it follows
that through the case studies presented above our model supports the view that the inernet and social media
played a critical role in the Arab Spring 2010-2011 [Howard et al., 2011, Lotan et al., 2011, Alterman, 2011,
Husain and Pollack, 2011, Khamis and Vaughn, 2011, Pollock, 2011, Saletan, 2011, Shirky, 2011, Stepanova,
2011, Zhuo et al., 2011].
4.3 Case Studies: Iran, China, and Somalia
Above we posed the question
4. Why is it that some regimes fall in a matter of weeks, others fight to a stalemate, and still others
survive relatively unscathed?
In our previous discussions we have seen that when a regime is subject to a shock the outcome depends on
the balance between the four parameters in our model: the visibility (α) and enthusiasm (c1) of protesters,
and the capacity (β) and efficiency (c2) of the police. We further explore this point by considering the cases
of Iran, China, and Somalia.
Question 4: The protests following Iran’s 2009 election, dubbed the “Green Revolution”, were ultimately
put down by the regime despite widespread use of social media technology. In particular, Burns and Eltham
[2009] emphasize the response of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and paramilitary force, the Basij, which un-
leashed a brutal crackdown in part by using Twitter to “hunt down and target Iranian pro-democracy
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activists”. Unfortunately, this result was partly caused by Haystack, a poorly vetted anti-censorship software
promoted by the US government, which
“not only failed at its goal of hiding messages from governments but also made it, in the words of
one analyst, ‘possible for an adversary to specifically pinpoint individual users.’ ” [Shirky, 2011]
The large amount of resources that were available to the Iranian regime is consistent with a large value of
β. The ability of the regime to harness social media to suppress protests, and to mobilize a well equipped and
motivated security force is consistent with a large c2. Moreover, since at the time of the Green Revolution
social media was still in its infancy9, α and c1 were unlikely to have felt the full impact of these new
communications technologies. Contributing to the lower values of α and c1 relative to the two case studies
presented above, is the lack of both experience with and prior examples of protests. When c1 is small and
c2 is large, c
∗ is small. So, in our model a 2009-era Iran with small c∗ and α, and large β, specifically
c∗ < 1 − α < β, is a stable police state (region III0), which is consistent with the failure of the Green
Revolution. In the future, more sophisticated methods for evading government detection and identification
may increase c1 at the expense of c2. Continued growth in Internet availability will increase α by increasing
visibility, while economic sanctions may increase α by stoking dissatisfaction with the regime. Examples of
successful revolutions in the Arab world and contact/support from successful revolutionaries from abroad
will also increase α and c1. If these factors manage to out pace the evolution of the regime’s police forces
(including their technological abilities) then it can be expected that Iran may pass into the meta-stable
(region IIIe) or unstable (region III1) police state regions in the future. A subsequent shock, perhaps due to
another highly contested election, may then trigger a revolution.
While the current regime in China differs from the pre-revolutionary regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in many
aspects, it is interesting to consider how our model may apply to China in terms of the influence of state
control on the media and the Internet, and police control of dissident opinion. The number of “mass group
incidents” reported annually in China has been rising consistently for at least two decades [Wedeman, 2009].
Being constantly subject to low but rising levels of protest may correspond to the civil unrest equilibrium
(r = c∗) in region IIIe of our model, which we have called the meta-stable police state region. In our model
rising levels of protest would correspond to rising c∗, where in this particular case, an increasing c∗ would
seem to be the result of an increase in the enthusiasm (c1) of protesters and not a decrease in the efficiency
of the regime (c2), except perhaps in terms of Internet censorship. Previously, we argued that regimes in
the meta-stable police state were potentially at an increased risk of revolution depending on the balance of
α, c∗, and β. Specifically, we stated that increasing c1, and hence c∗, decreases (increases) the magnitude of
shock needed to go from r = c∗ to the basin of attraction of r = 1 (r = 0), see Figure 11. A continued rise
of c∗ (via increasing c1) and a sudden or systematic rise in α through Internet and social media exposure in
China may eventually result in increasing the chance of a successful revolution. How soon this would occur
is not possible to say, since we are unable to determine accurately the magnitudes of 1− α, c∗, and β.
Finally, we consider the case of Somalia, which is widely considered to have been a failed state for more
than 20 years. During this period the country has seen the rise and fall of many local authorities and attempts
at re-establishing a national government [Menkhaus, 2007]. The failed state region (region II) features low α
(weak media) and low β (weak government). Low visibility (α) prevents individuals from joining any popular
movements and low policing capacity (β) prevents the government from reigning in existing movements.
This results mathematically in an uncountable number of equilibria contained in a subinterval of [0, 1], and is
consistent with the slow and erratic rise and fall of local militia and a succession of weak central governments.
Our model predicts that a successful national state could arise from either (a) improving policing capacity of
the transitional government (increasing β), or (b) increasing social cohesion and the capacity of the media in
Somalia (increasing α). Interestingly, due to the lack of central authority, as well as permanent infrastructure,
Somalia has developed a sophisticated and affordable telecommunications sector [Feldman, 2007], which may
mean that an increased α is not unrealistic.
9Facebook was launched in 2004 and was still an invitation-only service in 2005[Phillips, 2007]. Youtube was founded in early
2005 [YouTube, 2012] and Twitter was not founded until the spring of 2006 [Picard, 2011].
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0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
0 1 β 1-α 
c* 
Increasing levels of protest 
Figure 11: Effect of increasing c∗ when α + β > 1 and c1c1+c2 = c
∗ > 1 − α (region IIIe). Increasing c1
causes c∗ to increase as well. For small c1 (c∗) we see small numbers of protests that do not endanger the
regime. Growing c1 (c
∗) causes the size/number of protests to increase. Eventually, for large c1 (c∗) the
regime becomes endangered as the probability of a shock sufficient to trigger a full-scale revolution becomes
significant.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We began this paper by asking four questions related to the revolutions of the Arab Spring.
1. How can a small number of active social media users and relatively low Internet penetration have a
dramatic effect on the stability of a regime?,
2. How is it that regimes manages to seem so stable until the revolution is underway?,
3. Why did the January 28 - February 1 Internet shutdown in Egypt not have a greater inhibitory effect
on protests?, and
4. Why is it that some regimes fall in a matter of weeks, others fight to a stalemate, and still others
survive relatively unscathed?
We then established a simple one-compartment model that described the dynamics of a revolution sweep-
ing through a population that is near-unanimous in its intrinsic dislike of the current dictatorial regime.
Despite the crudeness of our model, we are able to identify four main parameter regions that correspond
to realistic situations in such countries: stable police state, meta-stable police state, unstable police state,
and failed state. These regions capture, at least qualitatively, a wide range of scenarios observed in the
context of revolutionary movements in countries ruled by dictatorial regimes. We examined two scenarios in
detail, Tunisia and Egypt. In the case of Tunisia we assumed that parameters were fixed for the lifetime of
the revolution and explored the effect of different parameter regimes on the dynamics of the revolution. In
contrast, for Egypt we had to assume that parameters evolved with the revolution due to the importance of
singular external events that were outside the scope of the basic model. In both cases, our results qualita-
tively matched data describing frequency of Twitter and Blog posts by subject, as presented in Howard et al.
[2011]. Finally, we briefly discussed how our model may further be able to describe aspects of the situation
in 2009 Iran, and present-day China and Somalia. We summarized these findings in Figure 3.
From the Tunisian case study we concluded that the emergence of a small number of social media users
and a low Internet penetration rate may have a large effect on the likelihood of a revolution. This effect
occurs because even a small increase in visibility or enthusiasm of revolutionaries can significantly decrease
the basin of attraction of total state control. This effect is further magnified by the nonlinear relationship
between the magnitude and likelihood of shocks that a regime is subject to. This phenomenon, together with
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the difficulty in establishing the parameters of models like ours, also explains why regimes manage to appear
stable until the revolution is underway. The Egyptian case study proposed a scenario which explains the
limited impact of Internet shutdown on protests. Essentially, by the time the Internet shutdown was fully
implemented the revolution was sufficiently large that individuals’ awareness was not impeded. Finally, our
review of Iran, China, and Somalia illustrates how our model is flexible enough to capture many different
situations present in the world today. This allows us to conclude that, despite the crudeness of our model,
it is nevertheless valuable as a qualitative and conceptual tool. It also indicates that our basic modelling
assumptions appear to capture essential components of the dynamics of revolutions in dictatorial regimes.
The simplicity of our model also leaves much room for further work. The adoption of a one-compartmental
model has required the assumption of a homogeneous population. One extension would be to expand the
model to include additional compartments that take into account the heterogeneous nature of the population.
For example, Internet and social media use in the Arab world is highly concentrated among the youth
[Howard et al., 2011], thus youth communicate between each other differently than they communicate with
their elders, or than elders communicate amongst themselves. We could therefore extend our model by
adding a compartment that explicitly takes into consideration the youth component of the revolutionary
movement. Similarly, we have assumed that the entire population desires regime change. This may not
be a good assumption in some cases. For example, in Syria the government has deep rooted support from
Alawite, Christian, and other minorities totalling approximately 25% of the population [Holiday, 2011]. So,
our model could be amended to include a separate compartment to explicitly model populations that are
likely to stay loyal to the regime until it is defeated. Such a model may also be more suitable for describing
past events in Libya and Bahrain. Another approach to improving this model is to be more careful when
choosing functional forms for the growth and decay terms in (1). One might do this, for example, by studying
the relationship between the micro-level threshold behaviour of individuals [Centola et al., 2005, Kuran, 1991]
and the macro-level behaviour of the growth term. Finally, since externalities, such as support or advice for
protesters from foreign sources, are thought to be important [Howard et al., 2011, Zhuo et al., 2011] it may
be advisable to model these external influences explicitly.
Computational power has improved drastically over the past few decades to the point of enabling highly
detailed and sophisticated models. However, this is not to say that there is no longer a role for simple
models. Simple models have the advantages of relying on fewer assumptions about individual and commu-
nal behaviour. They also admit a complete and rigorous mathematical analysis. For simple models, it is
frequently possible to characterize the entire parameter space and fully understand the behaviour of the
model under all parameter regimes. Despite their simplicity, these models nevertheless enable a conceptual
and qualitative understanding of the phenomenon in question as long as they capture essential processes in
the dynamics of the events under study. Simple models, therefore, remain valuable for establishing a basic
framework that can aid in understanding complex phenomena.
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